Introduction to British Military Operations in NW Europe 1944-45
Over the coming months we will take a look at the British practice of the operational art from Normandy to V-E Day. However, to preserve the widest possible interest, postings on other topics will be interspersed through this main topic.
The British counterpart to the US Army’s 12th Army Group (the First, Third, and Ninth US Armies) and 6th Army Group (the US Seventh and French First Armies) was the 21st Army Group comprised of the British Second Army and the Canadian First Army. Under the command of General (later Field Marshal) Bernard Montgomery from January 1944, some six months prior to D-Day through V-E Day and ending in August 1945. The 21st Army Group also included smaller forces from Poland, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium that were trained, equipped, and sustained by the British. Throughout the campaign in the ETO, the 21st Army Group operated on the left flank of the Allied advance across France and the Low Countries along the sea.
Commands and Commanders
General Omar Bradley’s US First Army was included under Montgomery’s command through June and July 1944 in Normandy, as Montgomery concurrently served as the Allied Ground Forces Command. As additional US divisions entered the theater, the US First Army was joined by General George S. Patton’s Third Army to form the US 12th Army Group commanded by Bradley. The flow of new American divisions into Europe continued to expand the 12th Army Group, as did the August 1944 arrival of the US Sixth Army Group on the French Mediterranean coast. Commanded by General General Jacob L. Devers, this force was comprised of Major General Alexander Patch’s US Seventh Army and the French First Army (initially, French Army B) under the command of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny.
On 1 September 1944, with American forces providing the majority of the Allied combat power in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower also assumed the responsibility of the Allied Ground Force. Thus, Montgomery retained command only of the British 21st Army Group, consisting of the British Second and Canadian First Armies. This greatly reduced his role at the strategic level of war, leaving him a primarily operational level role. Although this was inevitable given that the British Second Army was a declining asset as its casualties could not be replaced whereas fresh American forces would continue arriving in theater. Eisenhower also chose to assume direct responsibility for the ground force because Montgomery vehemently disagreed with the Supreme Commander’s strategy for the ground war. This turn of events greatly frustrated Montgomery and he never accommodated himself to the political reality that the largest provider (by far) of combat power in the ETO would be calling the shots at the strategic level. Starting in February 1945, after the American victory in the Ardennes, Eisenhower relegated Montgomery and his 21st Army Group to playing second fiddle in the final offensive into Germany
The Limitations of British Military Power
Throughout these nine months, Montgomery was constrained by the need to win victories, maintain British morale, play a major role in the defeat of Germany, and attain British war goals without incurring heavy casualties. Since 1940 the British had experienced substantial combat losses and frequent defeat in Norway, France, Greece and Crete, North Africa, Malaya, and Burma. Long troubled by the United Kingdom’s horrendous losses in the First World War, Montgomery understood there could be no repeat of the trench warfare that dominated that war. Two intertwined factors — morale and casualties — had the greatest influence on the planning and the conduct of 21st Army Group operations. This unavoidable reality meant that the 21st Army Group would not play the main role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, the British, Canadian, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, Czech, and American forces that were part of the 21st Army Group made important contributions that should not be overlooked.
While the US Army was growing in strength, adding divisions to the fight in Northwest Europe, the British Army was an ever declining asset which had to steadily disband divisions and other combat formations to provide replacements for the remaining divisions. Among the divisions and brigades that the British Second Army disbanded during the ETO campaign were the 56th Infantry Brigade (broken up in November 1944); 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division (disbanded 18 October 1944); 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division (“retired from operations” on 13 December 1944); and 27th Armoured Brigade (disbanded in July 1944).
From 7 July 1944, the Canadian 2nd Corps consisting of two infantry divisions, two armoured divisions (one Polish), and one separate armoured brigade, was an important and heavily committed part of the British Second Army. With the arrival of Canadian 1st Corps (one infantry and one armoured division, plus an armoured brigade) from Italy in March 1945, and the establishment of the Canadian First Army, the 21st Army Group fielded 6 armoured divisions (3 British, 2 Canadian, and 1 Polish) and 10 infantry divisions (7 British and 3 Canadian); plus one airborne division in the Allied First Airborne Army) for a total of 17 divisions.
A total of 61 American divisions (42 infantry, 15 armored, and 4 airborne) served in the ETO. France also provided 10 divisions (3 armored, 6 infantry, and one mountain). Therefore, of the 88 Allied divisions in the ETO, the US provided 69%; the French provided 11%; while the British, Canadian, and Poles combined provided just 20%. The US provided more than twice as many divisions as did all of the other allies combined.
Operational Doctrine and Tactical Employment
In future postings we will take a look at how the 1939-1943 experiences of the British Army influenced doctrine in the ETO and how that doctrine evolved in 1944-45. In addition, we’ll assess the operations of both the British Second and Canadian First Armies. Among the topics to be addressed are organization and equipment, training and morale, the unique 21st Army Group strengths and capabilities, and the combat leadership from Montgomery and his army and corps and division commanders. We will also look at the difference between the strategy ordered by General Eisenhower and that favored by Field Marshal Montgomery.
Recommended Reading
Listed here are the sources and references for this series of blogs, and brief reviews of how they contribute to a better understanding the operations of the 21st Army Group.
Allport, Alan. Browned Off and Bloody-Minded — The British Soldier Goes to War, 1939-1945. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 2015. A social history of soldiers in battle, this is an essential read for the serious student of the British Army in WWII. Among many issues, it gets to the heart of the fragility of British army morale in the ETO, a key factor in determining how that Army would plan and conduct military operations.
Barr, Niall. Eisenhower’s Armies — The American-British Alliance during World War II. New York and London: Pegasus Books; 2015. This is a story of the unprecedented and successful US-British alliance at the strategic level, including the controversies that had to be worked through.
Bouchery, Jean. The British Soldier from D-Day to V-E Day; Volume 2 Organisation, Armament, Tanks, and Vehicles. Paris: Histoire & Collections; 1999. This very handy reference provides a wealth of information on tables of equipment and organization; orders of battle; weapons, vehicles, and other equipment; and the official regimental names and their abbreviations.
Bouchery, Jean. The Canadian Soldier from D-Day to V-E Day: Organisation, Uniforms, Insignia, Equipment, Armament, Tanks and Vehicles. Paris: Histoire & Collections; 2003. Similar to The British Soldier from D-Day to V-E Day, but with information on the 19 August 1942 Dieppe raid.
Buckley, John. Monty’s Men — The British Army and the Liberation of Europe. The author acknowledges that the British Army was unable to exploit break-in and breakthrough operations to achieve strategically decisive results. However, he also makes the case that the British defeated their foe by conducting campaigns over the long-term by focusing on a full range of army activities including maximum firepower, intelligence, combat engineering, administration, and planning, and treating its manpower with a degree of respect that lives would not be wasted in futile or risky operations. He concludes that Montgomery had selected the best way to fight under the circumstances he faced.
Major Ellis, L. F., C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., MC. with Captain Allen, G. R. G., C. B. E., D.S.O. Royal Navy; Warhurst, A. E. Lieutenant Colonel; and Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, G. C. B., K. B. E., D. S.O., D. F. C., A. F. C. Victory in the West: Volume I, The Battle of Normandy. London: Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books; 1962. (Also reprinted by Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, Inc.) This is the official British joint services’ strategic and operational history of the Normandy Campaign. Appendices cover Allied naval forces in Operation Neptune; the development and production of landing ships and craft; German naval forces in the West; a detailed order of battle for the British 21st Army Group during the campaign; tables of organization and equipment; British and German weapons, vehicles, and equipment; and orders of battle and a description of the Allied Air Forces and the Luftwaffe.
Major Ellis, L. F., C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., MC. with Captain Allen, G. R. G., C. B. E., D.S.O. Royal Navy; Warhurst, A. E. Lieutenant Colonel. Victory in the West: Volume II, The Defeat of Germany. London: Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books; 1968. (Also reprinted by Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, Inc.). This volume picks up the story from the Normandy Campaign to the end of the war. The appendices provide similar information to that of Volume I.
English, John A. The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign — A Study of Failure in High Command. New York: Praeger; 1991. This excellent study assesses the battlefield failures of the Canadian Army resulting from the failure to maintain a high level of professionalism during the interwar years, resulting in the inability of the Canadian 2 Corps to effectively close the Falaise Gap in Normandy.
Forrester, Charles. Monty’s Functional Doctrine — Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45. Warwick, England: Halion & Company, Limited; 2015.
Hart, Stephen Ashley. Colossal Cracks — Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books; 2007. An excellent work on how Montgomery’s cautious, firepower-heavy operations addressed the limitations of his troops, minimized casualties and sustained morale, yet ensured that Britain would be able to play a major role in reshaping post-war Europe. A short, easy read that makes a compelling case that Montgomery and his army commanders deserve more credit for their performance than they have received. If you read only one book on the British 21st Army Group, this is the one.
Horne, Alistair and Montgomery, David. The Lonely Leader — Monty 1944-1945. London: Pan Books; 1994. An insightful study of Field Marshal Montgomery focused on his personality and its influence on his style of command and conduct of military operations from D-Day to V-E Day.
Prefer, Nathan N. The Conquering 9th — The Ninth U.S. Army in World War II. This highly readable book is included because, for much of its combat experience, Lieutenant General William H. Simpson’s army fought alongside on the right flank of the British 21st Army Group and for half of its nine months in combat, was attached to that army group. Probably no other US Army commander could have been so successful in his nearly constant interaction with Montgomery.
Stacey, C. P., Colonel O. B. E., C. D., A. M., Ph.D, LL.D., F. R. S. C.. The Victory Campaign — Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945. Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1960. This is Volume III in Canada’s official history of the Canadian Army during WWII told largely from the operational and tactical perspectives. In addition to having maps on par with those of the US Army official histories, this volume has helpful appendices covering directives for operations, orders of battle, and the names and ranks of officers from the army level down to brigades.
Maps, Books, and Battlefield Guidebooks
Additional readings, sources for good maps, and recommended battlefield guide books will be provided when we look at the battles and campaigns fought by the British 21st Army Group.
Miniature Wargaming
Miniature wargame scenarios involving formations of the 21st Army Group will be provided, as well as special rules for unique British capabilities such as armored engineer vehicles and armored personnel carriers.