As the Great War was coming to an end, the US Army had the First and Second Armies in the field in France.  The Third Army was not activated until 15 November 1918, four days after the Armistice was signed.  It then served as an occupation force with its headquarters in Koblenz, Germany.  It was deactivated on 2 July 1919 and replaced a new command, American Forces in Germany.  It was reactivated in 1932 as part of an army-wide reorganization that divided the continental US into four zones with one army located in each.  The Third Army was assigned to the southeastern zone with the mission of overseeing the training and mobilization plans of its assigned units, and developing contingency defense plans for the southern United States.  

Third Army from Normandy to Lorraine

It was not until 31 December 1943 that the Third Army was converted from a training army to a deployable field army.  Under a reorganization of the Army Ground Forces that took effect on 21 July 1943, the Army was designed to be both a tactical and administrative unit.  In the exercise of its administrative functions, the Army would bypass the next lower echelon of the Corps in every possible way in order that the Corps, the next subordinate echelon, could devote itself to training and tactical employment of its assigned divisions and other forces.  In summary, the principal functions of the Army and Corps command echelons were to provide command, control, and additional required combat support and combat service support for the divisions placed under their control.  

The permanent structure of the corps consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, a signal battalion, headquarters and headquarters battery for corps artillery, and a field artillery observation battalion.  Corps size and composition could vary greatly according to the combat situation.  A corps could control two or more divisions, with three or four being typical and usually including at least one armored division; a variable number of anti-aircraft artillery, field artillery, tank, and tank destroyer battalions, as well as other specialized engineer units and mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons.  An entire group could be attached to a division.  Alternatively, its battalions could be divided among multiple divisions.  Much of the combat service support required by divisions was also provided by the Corps.  Divisions (armored, infantry, or airborne) were the largest formation having a prescribed organization and functioned as the smallest formations including units of various arms and services.  They were designed for normal operational self-sufficiency.  

On 21 March 1944 the main body of the army’s headquarters troops arrived in England where it met its new commander, George Patton.  Over the coming months these personnel prepared to assume command of several corps in France after D-Day.  The army headquarters was secretly moved to Normandy.  Its location in an apple orchard in the Cotentin Peninsula is now marked as a historical site and is worth a visit.

At 1200 on 1 August 1944, the Third Army Headquarters was official activated.  Initially, it was assigned the VIII, XII, XV, and XX Corps.  At that same time, Brigadier General O.P. Weyland assumed command of the XIX Tactical Air Command which would support Third Army.  On the date of its activation, the Third Army’s total strength was 264,843 men (exclusive of the XIX Tactical Air Command).  The Third Army joined the already operational First US Army in General Bradley’s US 12^th Army Group.

Third Army Leadership and Organization

Third Army’s commander needs no introduction.  Suffice it to say that George S. Patton, Jr. was one of the most aggressive commanders in the ETO.  He had considerable combat experience from his participation in both world wars before assuming command of Third Army.  He was the product of a lifelong self-study of military history; mentorship by General Fox Connor, the Operations Officer of the American Expeditionary Force in The Great War, and probably the single greatest influence on the senior officers in WWII including Eisenhower; and, to a lesser extent, his professional military education in military service schools throughout his career.  A key to understanding Patton is that he thought and acted as a cavalryman — emphasizing aggressiveness, maneuver, and shock.

Patton’s Practice of the Operational Art

Historian John Nelson Rickard states in Patton at Bay — The Lorraine Campaign, 1944 (published by Brassey’s Inc.; Washington DC, 2004) that: “It would not be correct to say that Patton adhered to a battle doctrine.  With its connotation of inflexible obedience to certain perceived rules of war, ‘doctrine’ would not have accurately described his approach to fighting.”  (See Rickard’s Chapter 1 – A Philosophy of Battle). Rickard identifies the following traits of Patton’s unique approach to war:

– His approach was based primarily upon “a massive personal reading program” that influenced him more than his time as a student and instructor at army schools.

– Although he had some basic concepts of war, Patton “did not always think in terms of linear sequence” when making use of them.”  (Rickard; p. 1)

– He utilized these basic concepts in varying patterns much like a painter reaching for different shades of paint in a moment of inspiration.”

– “The fundamental influence of the cavalry on how Patton perceived tactics cannot be overstated.”

– Patton was able to blend the mobility, speed, and shock of cavalry with the relatively new concept of mechanization.

– He appreciated the value of strategic and battlefield intelligence and regularly acted upon these in his plans and operations.

– Patton believed in and pressed for continuous movement and had a strong appreciation for the passage of time.  He believed that a high operational tempo did not allow for detailed planning, but rather necessitated maintaining good situational awareness so as to be able to adapt and make rapid decisions.

Once Patton provided his staff a broad mission, scheme of maneuver, and his intent for the conduct of the operation, he let his staff do their work.  After he approved the plan, he made sure that his subordinates understood his intent and acted upon it.  Once the operation commenced, he personally monitored developments by roaming the front.  He also used the 6^th Cavalry Group (Mechanized) as an army-level reconnaissance unit in order to bypass traditional reporting channels and enable quicker decision making at the field army level.  He referred to it  as the Army Information Service and it was also nicknamed “Patton’s Household Cavalry.”

Patton believed that the best axes of advance could be found through study of the road network and  rivers.  Once that was done, he relied on his subordinates to examine the ground through which they passed in order to identify the topography that would most facilitate the fire and maneuver.  What he did was to make operational level decisions on operational-level considerations and let his tactical commanders operate within that context.

Patton was fortunate in having a better than average staff, arguably the best army level staff, in the ETO.  He picked them carefully.  Notable among them were his Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh Gaffey and the Deputy COS Brigadier General Hobart Gay (like Patton, both were armor officers like Patton) and Assistant COS for Intelligence (G2) Colonel Oscar Koch (who warned of the German buildup in the Ardennes).  Patton also had a first rate Assistant COS GS (Supply) that compensated for his lack of interest in the details of logistics.

Two corps were part of Third Army throughout this campaign: Major General Walton H. Walker’s XX Corps and Major General Manton S. Eddy’s XII Corps.  Major General Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps remained in Brittany to capture the port of Brest and while there was reassigned to the newly formed US Ninth Army.  Major General Wade Haislip’s XV Corps was part of Third Army from 6 July through 23 August, when it was reassigned to the First Army, then returned to Third Army from 29 August through 28 September, and remained attached to the Seventh Army for the remainder of the war.

Walker of XX Corps was an armor officer and was, like Patton, was energetic, aggressive, and visible across the battlefield.  Walker’s corps would occupy the northern part of the Third Army zone which was not as well suited for armor operations as the southern zone.  Major General Manton Eddy, an infantry officer, commanded XII Corps.  It was unfortunate that Eddy’s corps contained two of the three armored divisions in Third Army because, by nature, he was not as aggressive  or imaginative as Patton or Walker in the use of armor.  Unsurprisingly, he clashed frequently with Major General John Wood, the commanding general of the 4^th Armored Division and a Patton protégé.  Their relationship was further complicated by Wood’s expectation that, having led the corps for a 10-day period, he was entitled to retain command of it.  In retrospect, Wood would have been the better choice to lead XII Corps.

Third Army Order of Battle over the Campaign

The following formations served in Third Army during the Lorraine campaign, but not all were present for the entire operation.   The eleven field artillery groups controlled a total of 51 non-divisional field artillery battalions.

XX Corps (Major General Walton Walker) — 3^rd Mechanized Cavalry Group; 712^th, 735^th, and 738^th Tank Battalions; 609^th, 705^th, and 773^rd Tank Destroyer Battalions (Self-Propelled); 774^th, 802^nd, 818^th, and 807^th Tank Destroyer Battalions (Towed); 5^th Field Artillery Group (Self-Propelled); 40^th, 193^rd, 195^th, 203^rd, and 204^th Field Artillery Artillery Groups; 5^th, 90^th, and 95^th Infantry Divisions (Major Generals LeRoy Irwin, James Van Fleet, and Harry L. Twaddle, respectively).

XII Corps (Major General Manton Eddy) — 2^nd (Patton’s Household Cavalry) and 106^th Cavalry Groups (Mechanized); 702^nd, 737^th, and 761^st Tank Battalions; 602^nd. 603^rd, 655^th, and 704^th Tank Destroyer Battalions (Self-Propelled); 610^th, 691^st, and 808^th Tank Destroyer Battalions (Self-Propelled); and 177^th, 182^nd, 183^rd, 404^th, and 410^th Field Artillery Groups; 4^th, 6^th, and 10^th Armored Divisions (Major Generals John S. Wood, Robert W. Grow, and William H.H, Morris, respectively); and 26^th, 35^th, and 80^th Infantry Divisions (Major Generals Willard Paul Baade, and Horace McBride.

Combat Power and Proficiency Although faced with a shortage of fuel and, later, heavy artillery ammunition, the Third Army was in excellent shape.  Commanders and staff had gained good experience in its initial operations, and personnel and material losses had been low in the pursuit across France.  Morale was high as were hopes that Germany would soon be defeated.  Its performance was even more impressive than the German blitzkrieg of June 1940.  Several of its divisions, the 4^th and 6^th Armored and 90^th Infantry Divisions, were already demonstrating high levels of combat proficiency and would go on to become some of the best in the ETO.  American strengths included artillery, air support, and combat engineer support.  Patton and his army had little doubt that their rapid advance across France would continue in Lorraine.

The Germans

Initially, the Germans defending Lorraine included few first-rate troop formations.  Several shattered panzer divisions with only a handful of tanks provided an immediate reserve.  However, the Moselle and fortified Metz were held by determined defenders who maximized the inherent strength of the extensive fortifications.  However, this would quickly change as Third Army approached.  

Senior Leadership The German counterpart to the US 12^th Army was Army Group G, commanded by Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz until 21 September when he was replaced by General der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck.  Both were highly experienced combat commanders, as was Balck’s Chief of Staff, Friedrich von Mellinthin. 

Order of Battle Elements of three German armies faced US Third Army at some point during the campaign.  The order of battle below changed over the course of the campaign.  Many of the divisions listed were committed in a piecemeal manner and did not always fight as a complete organization.

First Armee (General der Panzertruppen) Otto von Knobelsdorff — LXXX Korps (General der Infanterie Franz Bayer) with 5. Fallschirmjäger Division and a battlegroup from Panzer Lehr Division; LXXXII Korps (General der Artillerie Johann Sinnhuber) with 19., 36., 416., 462.and 559. Volks Grenadier Divisions; XIII SS Korps (Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Herman Priess) with 17. SS, 3., and 15. (-) Panzer Grenadier Divisions; 462. and 553. Volks Grenadier Divisions; and Panzer Brigade 106.

Fifth Panzer Armee (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel) — XLVII Korps (General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz) with 21. Panzer Division (-) and Panzer Brigades 111, 112, and 113. 

Nineteenth Armee (General der Infanterie Friederich Weise) — LXVI Korps (General der Artillerie Walter Lucht) — 16. Infantrie Division, Kampfgruppe Ottenbacher, and elements of 21. Panzer and 15. Panzer Grenadier Divisions; LXIV Korps (General der Pioneer Karl Sachs) with 716. and 189. (Reserve) Infanterie Divisions; LXXXV Korps (Generalleutnant Baptist Kneiss) — 11. Panzer Division; and IV Luftwaffe Korps (Generalleutnant Erich Petersen) — 198. 159. Reserve, and 338. Infanterie Divisions.

Augmenting the above units at various times were the large 401. and 404. Volks Artillery Corps, and numerous flak, fortress, machine gun, anti-tank battalions, and other ad hoc units hastily thrown into battle.

Combat Power and Proficiency Most units were below their authorized manpower and material strengths.  The quality of personnel varied greatly and training for many was never completed.  German forces in Lorraine were particularly short in artillery and most of the infantry formations lacked their full authorization of anti-tank guns.  The newly-formed panzer brigades were not designed as balanced combined arms formations but rather as plug units of armor and infantry to support divisions in counterattacks.  They lacked organic artillery, engineers, reconnaissance, flak, and service units; yet they provided most of the German armored strength.  However, even weak units could hold fortifications for long periods of time and most formations fought hard as the Allies approached their homeland.

The Battlefield

The French province of Lorraine is located on the most and easiest route between France and Germany, making it a preferred route of invasion for centuries.  It is bounded on the west by the Moselle River and on the east by the Saar River with Luxembourg and the vast Ardennes forest to the north and the Vosges mountains to the south.  Unsurprisingly, ownership of Lorraine has changed many times.  Reclaimed from Germany after the Great War, it was then made part of Germany proper in 1940.  Not all of the residents of Lorraine welcomed the Allies as liberators.

The climate and terrain of Lorraine made it a difficult battlefield.  Much of the region is rolling farmland broken by woods and forests and dotted with towns and villages.  The ground rises gently from west to east, which meant that Third Army often would be fighting up hill against an enemy controlling the high ground.  Innumerable streams and several major rivers run generally north-south, and flooding was a common event.  

Except for its two principal cities of Metz and Nancy, Lorraine contained few military objectives.  Metz was protected by extensive fortifications. In addition, the French Maginot Line runs north-south across it, supplemented by low level areas that could be deliberately flooded.  Located along the Saar was the German Westwall — called the Siegfried Line by the Allies.

After the liberation of Lorraine, Patton sent the following message to the War Department: “I hope that in the final settlement of the war, you insist that the Germans retain Lorraine, because I can imagine no greater burden than to be the owner of this nasty country where it rains every day and where the whole wealth of the people consists in assorted manure piles.”