The autumn of 1944 started well enough for the Allies. They had broken out of Normandy and were now racing a defeated foe across France and the Lowlands to see who could reach the long-abandoned and unmanned shelter of the Westwall along Germany’s western border. There seemed to be a chance to “end the war in forty-four” and the Allies did not want to miss it. Brushing against the English Channel was the British 21st Army Group composed of the British Second and Canadian First Armies. On their right was the US 12th Army Group composed of the US First and Third. They would later be joined by the US Ninth Army, inserted as part of the US 12th Army Group on the flank of the British 21st Army Group, and the Seventh US Army, which had fought its way north from the Riviera toward a junction with the US Third army to establish a single front facing Germany.
Our focus in this posting will be on the operations of the US Third Army, commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., and the challenges it faced in the Lorraine Campaign in the autumn of 1944.
Upfront I’ll say that, looking across Patton’s operations in 1944-45, his performance in Loraine was far less impressive than his advance across France, counteroffensive in the Battle of the Bulge — probably his best performance, the advance to and across the Rhine, and the advance into Germany and Austria. I’m not sure why he seemed so out of his character in Lorraine and maybe writing this series of postings will help me better understand this.
Strategic Mission
The Combined Chiefs of Staff direction to General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, was short and clear: “You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with other nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” I placed the objectives of the last sentence in italics to emphasize them. Geographically, Eisenhower focused on taking the Ruhr industrial region to deny this capacity to the Germans. He believed that, by doing so, the German army would have to vigorously make a stand. This, he further believed, provided the opportunity to destroy the German army and end the war. On pages 70-71 of The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944 — An Operational Assessment, authorJohn A. Adams succinctly captured Eisenhower’s guiding strategic concept:
“- The objective is not geographical; it is the German Army.
– Engage the Wehrmacht west of the Rhine as close to Allied logistical bases as possible.
– Destroy it in a war of maneuver.
– Retain the advantage of Allied mobility by retaining the ability to shift the main point of effort.
– Do not allow the Germans to counter-concentrate against a single Allied axis of advance.
– Maintain logistical balance.
– Retain options as long as possible.”
As will be seen, most of his army group and army commanders, including Patton, saw their own sector as best suited for operations leading to an early victory.
The Challenges Facing Eisenhower’s Strategy
Coalition Warfare Eisenhower had to dedicate much time and energy to managing the alliance and, in particular the American, British, Canadian, and French generals commanding the allied armies, which eventually numbered nine — and that’s not even counting the commanders of their supporting tactical air forces. With their differing national postwar goals, different doctrines, and focus on how history would perceive their performance, this was no simple task. His greatest challenge in this regard was that he could not exercise tight command over them, but had to balance their national and individual perspectives and needs within the broad terms of the mission he was given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
All maps in this series of blogs are from The US Army in Word War II — The European Theater of Operations: The Lorraine Campaign by Hugh M. Cole
Fortunately, the SHAEF staff was a well-organized team of first rate professionals who worked effectively under Eisenhower’s style of leadership. A large part of its success was attributable to his ability to get the best out of a group of individuals. He was ably assisted by his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell whose strong presence considerably aided Ike in his role as a fair and balanced team leader. Directly subordinate to Smith were two highly capable British Lieutenant Generals, Humfrey M. Gale and Frederick E. Morgan, who have not received much recognition for their contributions. General Gale was responsible for personnel (G1) and logistics (G4) matters. General Morgan handled intelligence (G2) and operations (G3), supported in those roles by British Major General Kenneth Strong and US Brigadier General Harold R. Bull, respectively. These two individuals also deserve more attention for their service in these capacities. These general officers were assisted an inter-allied planning staff. Eisenhower depended heavily on this team which enabled him to focus on operational matters, including the direction of his army group and army commanders. On several occasions, Patton needed more direction from Ike than others. Eisenhower knew better than Bradley, Patton’s immediate senior in the ETO, how to handle his most aggressive American army commander.
Terrain and Weather These two factors, largely beyond SHAEF’s control, had a major impact on operations. The key features of the Western European battlefield were its compartmented nature, the result of its large urban and industrial areas and extensive forestation, and hills or mountain ranges. In addition, an army on the offensive in the ETO could expect to encounter a river or canal 75 to 100 yards wide every 24 miles/38.4 kilometers; one 200 yards wide every 100 miles/160 kilometers; and one at least 300 yards wide every 200 miles/320 kilometers. Despite its relatively well developed road, rail, and waterway networks, as well as a considerable number of seaports, including massive, Antwerp, Western Europe posed numerous challenges to fighting deep battles of maneuver.
The oncoming signs of winter — eventually one of the worst to be experienced in decades — were already obvious at the start of the Lorraine Campaign in September 1944. Cloud cover and precipitation worsened, impacting ground maneuver and reducing the availability of airpower, which provided much of the Allied firepower and boost to the morale of the average soldier. Tommies and GIs also increasingly suffered due to bad weather and non-combat casualties soared. No doubt the onslaught of winter weather was another great incentive for the Allies to the end the war in forty-four.
Sustaining Offensive Action Two additional factors placed tremendous limitations on the Allied ability to sustain major offensives and limited the exploitation of fleeting opportunities. The most well known was ever-increasing logistical constraints due to the lack of major ports as the Allies advanced eastwards. While there was no shortage of supplies and material, getting it to the front when and where needed became increasingly difficult. In short, operations had to be carefully considered and phased, which meant that the full Allied strength could not be applied at one time.
Another limiting factor was the small size of the Allied armies given their mission. Although US Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall’s original plan for fielding 300 divisions was unrealistic, the army of 89 divisions was insufficient for a global war. Considering the size of Western Europe and the scope of operations, Eisenhower’s ground component was far too small. This made it difficult for commanders to concentrate their forces. Perhaps more importantly, it meant that there was never sufficient force to provide for a strategic reserve at SHAEF, army group, and army levels to exploit success — or respond to surprises such as the German Ardennes Offensive. In particular, American army commanders, including Patton in Lorraine, as will be seen, spread their forces too thinly. Although the Germans would be greatly outnumbered materially, they rarely were outnumbered when it came to infantry.
The Enemy’s Application of the Operational Art at the Tactical Level Finally, despite consistent failure at the strategic level and frequent shortcomings in the application of the operational art, the Germans remained pretty darned good at the tactical level. The terrain and weather, the lack of Allied strategic reserves, and the fear of losing an existential war certainly reinforced their tactical determination and resilience. Of note, the only strategic counteroffensive that the Germans made between August and December 1944 was against Patton in Lorraine.
Focus on the Operational Level
I believe that Eisenhower was thinking in terms of campaigns by army groups, emphasizing maneuver, that would create favorable opportunities for tactical victories to achieve his assigned mission. This placed a priority on the principles of concentration of force and focus on the objective — the destruction of the enemy armed forces. He learned this from his mentor General Fox Connor, the American Expeditionary Forces Operations Officer, in the First World War. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, another mentee of Fox, also shared this approach to war, which was part of the reason that Eisenhower had been Marshall’s natural choice to head the army’s War Plans Division in February 1942. They were, in many ways, the perfect senior command team.
Eisenhower — and Patton — had also been early advocates of the tank and the opportunity for maneuver that mechanization provided. Neither fully agreed with the doctrine they encountered while attending the Army Command and General Staff College, which favored mass, frontal attacks, and victory through attrition.
In my opinion, those who have described Eisenhower’s strategy and operations as a broad front advance with all armies attacking at the same time and close to equal weight mischaracterizes how Eisenhower approached his mission. Rather, the Supreme Commander developed his theater campaign plans on maneuver leading to combat on terms most favorable to the Allies. Eisenhower’s orders throughout the campaign and his reports to Marshall also show the priority he placed on destroying the German army. Coordinated maneuver by his armies was intended to keep the enemy off balance, retain the initiative for the Allies, and create situations to concentrate forces for the kill. Although the quirks of Patton’s personality undermined their friendship, I think that, operationally speaking, Ike and George had very similar approaches to warfare and, among the principles of war, priority on the objective. Nonetheless, even as the Supreme Commander authorized major offensives by the British Second and the US First Armies, Patton persisted in making the case that his army in Lorraine was ideally positioned to carry the war into the heart of Germany.
Unfortunately, Patton’s relationship with his immediate superior, General Omar Bradley (previously his subordinate in Sicily) also was strained. Bradley considered Patton vulgar, politically naive, eccentric, and a bit too risk prone at times. They did, however, share the belief that British Field Marshal Montgomery, commanding British 21st Army Group, was too methodical in his operations and that the British army was too small for the task. Their shared distaste for Montgomery would bring the two Americans closer together later during the Battle of Bulge. But I’m getting ahead of the story….