Future postings will list some books and studies that provided information on and analysis of the Lorraine campaign. I’ll share my what I’ve learned from my study of this campaign, especially with regard to the command decisions at the operational and tactical levels. Following that, we will look at how miniature wargaming can add to your understanding of operations in the campaign. The Lorraine case study will end with what to expect seeing on a visit to the battlefield and how to make the most use of your available time
Introductory Reading
Two of Osprey Publishing’s books by Steven J. Zaloga: Lorraine 1944 — Patton vs. Manteuffel,published in 2000, and Metz 1944 — Patton’s Fortified Nemesis, published in 2012, provide good, concise introductions to the Lorraine Campaign. These 96-page books include a chronology, excellent maps, overviews of plans, short biographies of commanders, a comparison of the opposing armies, and useful orders of battle.
More detailed coverage of the entire campaign that fills gaps in the Osprey books is Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, 1944 by John Nelson Rickard, published by Brasseys, Inc., in 2004. Rickard also covers the December period of the Lorraine campaign which is only lightly touched upon by the Osprey Books. In the final chapter of this excellent book, the author makes the case that Patton’d failure to adapt his plans to the situation he faced resulted in a disappointing and costly campaign that required over three months and 50,000 casualties (one-third of Third Army’s overall losses in WWII) to advance over the 46 miles from the Moselle to Saar Rivers (the latter marking there German border), far short of the Rhine and Patton’s designated objective of Frankfurt-am-Main. In short, Lorraine was Patton’s most disappointing performance in WWII, although he would soon redeem himself in the Ardennes. His critique is fair and balanced and well worth reading.
Lorraine within the Context of Eisenhower’s Strategy and Operational Concept
When you are ready to immerse yourself more into the Lorraine campaign, I recommend that next three books that place the Lorraine campaign within the larger ETO strategy and Eisenhower’s concept of operations.
Although published in 1981 by the Indiana University Press, Russell F. Weigley’s Eisenhower’s Lieutenants — The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945 remains an authoritative work on the performance of the US Army in the European Theater. Weigley concludes that the US Army performance in the ETO was critically weakened by an identity crisis. Specifically, quoting from page 728, “Shaped by a constabulary force for small wars, the American army entered upon the Second World War, and eventually upon the great campaign in France in the summer of 1944 and across Germany in the spring of 1945 was the most mobile in the world at the expense of power.” He then explains how the only US experiences of combat in the Civil War and WWI “had convinced the army’s leadership that victory in a large-scale war depends upon a strategy of direct confrontation with the enemy’s main forces in order to destroy them.” This, (quoting from page 729: “The disjuncture between a power-driven strategy aimed at confronting the enemy’s main forces to destroy them, and an army not designed to generate sustained combat power, but for mobility, suggests a more basic flaw in the American army and its generalship.
Weigley devotes two chapters specifically to the Lorraine campaign which are highly critical of Patton, particularly since, as he points out, Patton had traveled across Lorraine and traveled across it (during the interwar years) and had studied that campaigns there throughout recorded history. The failures he points out include underestimating the strength of fortifications at Metz and along the German border; failing to concentrate sufficient strength for breaking through strong defenses and then having insufficient reserves to exploit the situation. For example, in the November Offensive, the US First Army attacked with ten divisions on a still too-wide 23-mile/38 kilometer front while Third Army attacked on a front of more than 60 miles/100 kilometers characterized by numerous salients and reentrants.
British author C.J. Dick From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944, published by the University of Kansas Press, focuses on the operational art. This is the first in a two-volume series Dick calls “Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations.” (The second volume is entitled Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 1944.”) The first half of the book assesses Allied operational performance
The focus of this work is on the Allied practice of operational art up to their unexpectedly rapid advance across France and the unanticipated dilemma posed by the fleeting opportunity to quickly enter Germany and end the war before the lack of logistical support (and poor generalship) would cause the cause that advance to culminate. One of his key conclusions (quoting from page 315) is that: “A fundamentally flawed operational-strategic idea will generally result in failure. If the concept is merely imperfect or confused, it can sometimes be rescued from failure by excellent lower-level operational and tactical judgment and execution. By the same token, its deficiencies will be compounded by poor lower-level performance, and defeat, or at best, frustration of the aim will be inevitable. Unfortunately for the Allied cause, the handling of both army groups [British 21st and US 12th] the handling of both army groups and armies was sufficiently imperfect as to result in culmination well short of achievement of the aim.” Not surprisingly, Dick is highly critical of Patton’s performance in Lorraine.
What I particularly like about John A. Adams’ The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944: An Operational Assessment, a relatively new book published by the University of Indiana Press in 2020, is that, while critical of the Allied generalship like Weigly and Dick, the author is far more specific in presenting detailed alternative alternative schemes of maneuver including maps covering the late summer and into the winter of 1944. His criticism of why Third Army’s operations in Lorraine proved costly and ultimately failed strike me as right on the mark. His alternatives would have had a better chance of being successful, or at least less disappointing. Whether one agrees with these alternatives, Dick does a great job of walking readers through them.
The author is very supportive of Eisenhower’s operational concept, which Adams describes as a “two-axis, two-phase” plan of advancing toward the Rhine with two main thrusts in the north and only supporting attacks elsewhere in the center and south, leading to the destruction of the German army west of the Rhine, with both thrusts — with additional attacks to their south crossing the Rhine and advancing into the heart of Germany. Dick argues that Eisenhower was not calling for a continuous broad advance along the entire front in which “everyone is always attacking.” Dick is vehement in his belief that his two primary subordinates, British Field Marshal Montgomery and American Bradley either did not understand or had alternative motives (Dick argues that neither wanted to be subordinated to the other). The result, he argues, was a missed opportunity to end the war in 1944. However, he faults Ike, highly in my opinion, for not sufficiently inculcating these two senior leaders — while at the same time recognizing that Allies never fully have the essential unity of command needed in developing strategy and executing the enabling operations.
I really like this book — despite its many inexcusable typos (where was the editor?). It is extensively researched, well-organized, and written. His focus on the relationship between strategy and operations is especially appealing to me. I don’t understand why this book hasn’t received more attention — both positive and negative. But I encourage you to read it and come to your own conclusion
What’s Next
Part II will provide more recommended readings on the Lorraine campaign, with the focus on generalship and the practice of the operational art, tactics, and individual battles.