Whether visiting a battlefield, playing a wargame, or simply reading the history of the European Theater of Operations, it is extremely helpful to have a good understanding of Allied and German Orders of Battle (OOBs) and Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&Es).  This posting is intended to provide an introduction to the purposes and uses of both, and is not a command and general staff college level presentation.

An OOB is a listing of the military formations by their identification and relative command relationship among those formations.  A TO&E documents the formation’s organization, authorized manpower strength, and numbers and types of weapons and other equipment types according to the army’s military doctrine.  

A working understanding of friendly and enemy OOBs and TO&Es is extremely beneficial in understanding how operations in the ETO evolved.  Such knowledge also assists the commander in a miniature wargame in developing his intelligence estimate of the enemy to include overall combat proficiency, types of operations that may be conducted, and insight into enemy intent and possible courses of action.  

What an OOB Tell Us

Orders of battle provide an identity for foreign and friendly military formations in the forms of number designation and type of formation.  Examples include 116. Panzer Division (a German armored formation), 82^nd Airborne Division (a US parachute and glider division), and 51^st (Highland) Infantry Division (a British infantry division with personnel from the Scottish Highlands).  The 116^th Cavalry Group (Mechanized) was a US reconnaissance unit; Fallschirmjäger Regiment 6 was a separate German parachute regiment; and the 3^rd Army Group, Royal Artillery was a British formation.  Some sense of the formation’s size is evident from its designation.  

Formations of the Allied armies had standard organizations.  For example, American, British, and Canadian infantry divisions had 3 infantry regiments (in the US Army) or 3 infantry brigades in the British and Canadian Armies.  Each had organic artillery support in the form of 3 battalion equivalent formations (called battalions in the US Army and “regiments” in the British and Canadian armies; the equivalent of an engineer battalion; and a division-level reconnaissance element.

The formation’s commander’s name and its history are pieces of information that intelligence organizations are interested in knowing because that provides insight into its tactical and operational proficiency.  

The hierarchy of command and where the formation of interest fits within the larger military formation is also important. 

Here is the OOB for the XII Corps of the US Third Army crossing of the Moselle River at Dieulouard in Lorraine from 11 to 16 September 1944).

80^th Infantry Division (Major General Horace McBride) of the XII Corps.

Division Artillery (Commanding Officer not known)

– 313^th, 314^th, and 905^th Field Artillery Battalions (Light)

– 315^th Field Artillery Battalion (Medium)

80^th Reconnaissance Troop

305^th Engineer Combat Battalion (Major Charles Crocker) — Detached to 1117^th Engineer Combat Group

317^th Infantry (Colonel A.D. Cameron) — Less 3/317^th Infantry.

– 1/317^th Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Sterling Burnett)

– 2/317^th Infantry (Commanding Officer not known)

318^th Infantry (Colonel Harry D. McHugh)

– 1/318^th Infantry (Major W. Henderson) — Attached CCA/4th Armored Division thru 9/16.

– 2/318^th Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel John Golden)

– 3/318^th Infantry (Major Karl Nuessner)

1/319^th Infantry (Commanding Officer not known) — Available on 9/15.

Attached to Division Artillery:

404^th Field Artillery Group

– 512^th Field Artillery Battalions (Light)

– 775^th and 176^th Field Artillery Battalions (Medium)

– 974^th Field Artillery Battalion (Medium)

Attached to 80^th Infantry Division:

– 702^nd Tank Battalion — Less Company C

– C/610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed)

– 619^th Tank Destroy Battalion (Towed) — attached on 9/16.

– 633^rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion (Mobile)

Attached to the 80^th Infantry Division:

1117^th Engineer Combat Group (Colonel R.G. Lovett)

– 306^th Engineer Combat Battalion — Less Company C

– B/167th Engineer Combat Battalion (Captain Paul Cote)

– B/248th Engineer Combat Battalion (Captain E.H. Cockrell)

– C/557th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion (Major Brooks)

– 305^th Engineer Combat Battalion attached from 80^th Infantry Division

Opposing this operation were 6 German combined arms Battlegroups (Kampfgruppen) built around regiments from 4 divisions.  Only the first of these arrived on 13 September and all others arrived over the following day.

XLVII Panzer Korps (General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz) of the German First Army.

– Kampfgruppe built around Panzer Grenadier Regiment 29 from 3. Panzer Grenadier Division.

– Kampfgruppe built around SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 38 — Less III Battalion from 17. SS Panzer Grenadier Division.

– 2 Kampfgruppen built around Panzer Grenadier Regiment 115 and Panzer Aufklärungs (recon) Battalion 115 from 15. Panzer Grenadier Division.

-2 Kampfgruppen built around Volks Grenadier Regiment 1119 and the attached II/Luftwaffe Flieger Regiment 92 from 553. Volksgrenadier Division (Oberst Erich Löhr)

– Unknown elements of XLVII Panzer Korps artillery.

In the first example, the attachments to and detachments from the 80^th Infantry Division are clear.  Assets provided from XII Corps are also clear.  I try to find the historical OOB, including artillery and engineer formations, as well as the names of the commanding officers. 

Obtaining such an accurate and detailed OOB of the enemy would be impossible, but that’s what intelligence organizations strive to achieve.  The myriad German units in the second example would have been confusing to the Americans — and certainly pose a coordination challenge to the Germans.  However, the actual German manpower and material strengths and the numbers of types of weapons available, in all probability were not determinable by XII Corps and the 80^th Infantry Division intelligencer officer.

What TO&Es Tell Us

The divisions, regiments, and battalions of the Allied armies in the ETO were organized and equipped in  a standard manner that allowed for a building block approach, which in turn made it easy to detach and attach units across formations.  Receiving commanders usually knew the size, equipment, and capabilities of attached and reinforcing units.  

This was rarely the case in the German Army.  Throughout most of the campaign, the Germans fought with two very different infantry division TO&Es; the hastily fielded Panzer Brigades were also of two main types; and SS Panzer Divisions were larger and better equipped than their counterpart in the Heer (army).  This added a further complication for Allied intelligence in assessing the combat capability of opposing enemy formations.  The 15 March 1945 edition of the War Department’s “Handbook on German Military Forces” identifies 14 different TO&Es for infantry, alpine, airborne, panzer, and panzer grenadier divisions! 

Most importantly, the heavy casualties and logistical challenges that all armies experienced in the ETO meant that only in the rarest of circumstances were formations at or even close to their authorized TO&Es.  As that campaign progressed, German formations also were rushed into combat before completing much if not most of their training programs.  Even with good intelligence on enemy TO&Es, estimating the combat effectiveness, tactical proficiency, and sustainability of German formations increasingly was intangible.  Also, the Germans often substituted different artillery and vehicle types, often captured Russian ones, for German material that was unavailable.  The substitution of less effective assault guns and tank destroyers for tanks was also common.

Here are several simplified examples of American and German TO&Es.

US Infantry Battalion TO&E 7-15 effective 26 February 1944.

– Total Strength: 35 Officers and 836 Enlisted Personnel (871 total).

– Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company: 9 Officers and 117 Enlisted Personnel.

– Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon: 1 Officer and 26 Enlisted Personnel.

– Anti-Tank Platoon: 1 Officer and 32 Enlisted Personnel (33 total); 3 57mm Anti-Tank Guns.

– 3 Rifle Companies; each with 6 Officers and 187 Enlisted Personnel.  Company Headquarters of 2 Officers and 33 Enlisted Personnel (35 total); Weapons Platoon of 1 Officer and 34 Enlisted Personnel (35 total) with 3 60mm mortars and 2 .30 caliber light machine guns; and 3 Rifle Platoons each of 1 Officer and 40 Enlisted Personnel (41 Total).

US Tank Battalion TO&E 17-25 effective 15 September 1943.

– Total Strength: 41 Officers and 709 Enlisted Personnel (750 total).

– 3 Medium Tank Companies each with 17 tanks (51 tanks total).

– Light Tank Company with 17 tanks (17 tanks).

– Assault Gun Platoon with 6 105mm-armed Medium Tanks.

– Mortar Platoon with 3 halftrack 81mm mortars.

(References for the above: Stanton, Shelby; World War II Order of Battle.  New York: Galahad Books; 1984.)

Panzer Battalion Type 1944 (Panzer Regiments were authorized 2 panzer battalions, one each of Panther and Mark IV panzers).

– Staff Company with 3 command tanks.

– Flak Platoon with 3 Self-propelled 2cm AA guns.

– Tank Recon Platoon with 4 Mark IVs

– Four Tank companies each with 17 or 22 tanks.

– Panzer Maintenance Company.

– Panzer Supply Company.

Reference for the above: Rosado, Jorge and Bishop, Chris; Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions 1939-45.  London: Amber Books; 2004.

Volks Grenadier Battalion.

– Total Strength: 15 Officers and 527 Enlisted Personnel (642 total).

– Three Grenadier Companies each 2 Officers and 117 Enlisted Personnel (each 119 total).

– Heavy Weapons Company of 3 Officers and 191 Enlisted Personnel (194 total); 8 heavy machine guns; 6 80mm mortars; and 4 75mm infantry guns.

Reference for the above: US War Department; Handbook on German Military Forces.  Washington DC: Government Printing Office; 15 March 1945.

Why All This Is Important

Although competitive wargamers have a predilection for scenarios that are balanced by means of a point-based system for their commands and often for the terrain, such equal contests were exceeding rare in the ETO, and throughout all military history.  For those who wargame to gain insights into the 1944-45 battles and campaigns in Western Europe to better understand history or prepare for battlefield visits, obtaining and understanding relevant OOBs and TO&Es can be extremely beneficial.

What’s Coming Next

My next posting will provide hard copy and online sources for obtaining reliable OOB and TO&E information, as well as the best information on actual German strengths relative to their TO&Es.  

Thank you for reading this!

I welcome your thoughts and suggestions regarding this blog.  It’s a labor of love for me, and I enjoy sharing what I do and learn along the way, but would also like to hear and learn from your knowledge and experiences.  So please leave a comment or start a discussion!