To understand the role of Cherbourg and other Fortified Ports lets look at Military historian James A. Huston’s definition of Logistics. He says logistics is “The application to war of the factors of time and space and takes into account the three Ms: Material, Movement, and Maintenance.”  Others have expanded the definition to include industrial mobilization, national economies and fiscal policy, research and development, and the training and equipping of troops.  In The Allure of Battle — A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost, historian Cathal J. Nolan makes the case that, beginning with Napoleon and continuing to the end of WWII, massive wars “have been more fundamentally determined by prolonged stalemate and attrition, wars in which the determining factor was not tactical but industrial.”  What certainly was clear by 1944 was that a senior military officer lacking a developed understanding of and appreciation for logistics could not succeed on the battlefield.  

For these reasons, as well as my Navy background and interest in the Battle of the Atlantic, Margot and I have visited most of the major ports along the French coast from Saint-Nazaire, completely around Brittany and Normandy and to Belgian ports, including Antwerp the largest of all the ports along this lengthy coastline.

Logistics, Ports, and Strategy Possession of large, deep-water ports was a major factor in the Allied planning for the invasion of Normandy and the advance toward Germany.  Priority was attached to the early capture of Cherbourg; high hopes were placed on the rapid capture of and usage of the numerous Breton ports; and the port of Antwerp was the major prize of all as it was conveniently close to the German border and able to supply the daily needs of about 54 Allied divisions.

Among the reasons for the Allied selection of Normandy as the invasion site was the proximity of Cherbourg on the northern seacoast of the Cotentin Peninsula to the excellent beaches a short distance to its south.  It was also appreciated that the taking of the entire peninsula would provide depth for the port’s protection against German counterattacks.  Seizing Cherbourg before the Germans could demolish its facilities was the primary objective for the US Army in the weeks following D-Day.

Long before that invasion, Hitler had declared the major ports to be fortresses to be held to the bitter end, leaving the harbor facilities in ruins.  At the time and to this day, there is disagreement on whether this was a good decision.  Ideally, the Germans needed to defend a port only long enough to demolish its facilities, after which the defenders could be withdrawn.  Determining the timing of this was a challenge, particularly if the attackers were quick to invest the port and close all routes of escape.  The situation at Cherbourg was especially complicated for the Germans as a large garrison was required to defend it, yet once the Americans had isolated Festung Cherbourg at the northern end of the peninsula, its defenders could not escape.  In May 1944, weeks before the Allied landings, General Karl von Schlieben of 709. Infanterie Division proposed the immediate destruction of the port, but that good idea went nowhere as the Kriegsmarine objected on the basis of its continuing importance to naval operations.

Reducing the fortress ports of Cherbourg, Saint-Malo, and Le Havre, would prove costly to the Allies in terms of time, expended supplies, heavy casualties, and missed opportunities.  By the time the Allies entered Brittany, the value of its ports had declined considerably due to the unexpectedly rapid breakout across France toward Germany.  The capture of Brest in westernmost Brittany wasn’t worth the effort that was required to take its ruins, as that port was too distant from steadily eastward advancing front.  Even before Brest had fallen, plans to use the Breton ports and build another artificial harbor in southeastern Brittany were cancelled.  Thus, German-held Lorient and Saint-Nazaire in southeastern Brittany were contained until the end of the war.  Historian C.J. Dicks has made the case that the US VIII Corps, which took Brest, would have been better employed at Antwerp where the overstretched British 21^st Army Group had captured the port intact, but left the Germans in control of the lengthy waterways leading to it from the sea.

However, the Germans also paid a heavy cost including 25,000 men lost at Cherbourg, the equivalent of two divisions at Saint-Malo, and elements of three more at Brest.  German military historian Joachim Ludweg notes that, in all, 92,000 German troops were lost or bottled up in Cherbourg, Saint-Malo, Brest, Lorient, and Saint-Nazaire.  The huge German garrison on the occupied British Channel Islands, and an immense investment in guns, concrete, and steel there, also served no useful military purpose.

Cherbourg: Lessons of 1940 Decades before the Germans invaded the Cotentin Peninsula, the French established impressive coast defenses at Cherbourg, both on the high ground and in forts on the extensive breakwaters.  However, by WWII, the French placed a lesser priority on its defenses against land attack.  On 17 June 1940, as negotiations began between the French and German governments, General Rommel’s 7. Panzer Division arrived outside Cherbourg.  Here, its advance was halted by a hasty defense through the night of 18/19 June.  On the following morning, as the Germans fought their way toward the port, they were shelled by French warships.  A few remaining French positions held up the German entry into the port until the morning of 19 June.  However, the nature of the steep hills and ridges, crossed by numerous waterways and covered in hedgerows and woods, proved to be the greatest challenge faced by the attackers.  It was a lesson that the Germans did not forget. 

Preparing for D-Day In November 1943, with the Allied invasion of Europe expected in the foreseeable future, Field Marshal Rommel ordered the construction of a “Landfront” around Cherbourg to defend it against an Allied attack from land following a successful landing nearby.  The Landfront exploited the rough, compartmented nature of the terrain, as well as the concrete structures of  incomplete V-1 launching sites south of the city.  In all, the Cherbourg Landfront contained 85 steel-reinforced concrete, mutually supportive defensive positions in a hemispherical shape about 25 miles/40 kilometers wide, 6 miles/10 kilometers deep, and a curving front about 28 miles/45 kilometers wide.  Extensive minefields and barbed wire obstacles were everywhere.  

After D-Day Following the isolation of the Cotentin Peninsula by the Americans on 17 June,  General Karl von Schliebern, Hitler’s designated commander of Festung Cherbourg, had elements of four well understrength infantry divisions holding the Landfront.  Even with additional numbers of rear area army troops, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine personnel, this was an insufficient force for the length of the landward facing defensive line.  Armor support was negligible and and there were few anti-tank guns, although automatic and heavy anti-aircraft guns were present in great numbers.  Twenty-four Army and Navy fortified coastal artillery batteries protected against attack from the sea.  Hitler expected that Festung Cherbourg would hold out for several months; he went into a rage upon learning how relatively quickly it was taken.  Yet he continued to insist that the coastal “fortresses” be held to the bitter end.

Overview of the Battle for Cherbourg On D+5 (11 June), the US 90^th Infantry Division attacked west from the Utah Beach lodgment area on the eastern side of the Cotentin Peninsula to seal off German reinforcement of and escape from Cherbourg.  However, the inexperienced division performed poorly and on 15 June, the 82^nd Airborne and 9^th Infantry Divisions were added to this attack.  (Under new leadership, the 90^th Infantry Division would later become one of best divisions in the ETO.)  On 17 June, the 60^th Infantry of the 9^th Infantry Division reached the western coast, thereby isolating Festung Cherbourg.  Meanwhile, from 8 to 14 June, the 4^th and 79^th Infantry Divisions were pushing north toward the port from Utah Beach against heavy resistance, particularly in the Montebourg area.  Not until 19 June would the VII Corps’ 4^th, 9^th, and 79^th Infantry Divisions be in place to tackle the Festung Cherbourg Landfront.  

Determined resistance centered on strongpoints in very difficult terrain lasted until 21 June when the Americans finally reached the inner defenses around the port, but it would take until 25 June for the infantry to reach the port.  That same day, Battery Hamburg’s four 280mm (11-inch) engaged and drove away a US Navy task force of three battleships and five destroyers, slightly damaging the battleship USS TEXAS and three destroyers with only a single German gun being knocked out of action.  Not until 28 June were the remaining outlying Germans positions around the harbor taken.  Fortified German positions at Cap de la Hague west of Cherbourg held out until 30 June.  

Although, the Germans had destroyed most of Cherbourg’s port facilities and extensively mined its waters, the US Army and Navy had anticipated this and were well-prepared to deal with the situation.  Repairs and reconstruction began as early as 28 June and initial port operations commenced on 16 July.  By early August, Cherbourg reached its planned initial goal of 8,500 tons per day and the port achieved its full capability of 29,000 tons per day on 29 September.

Visiting Cherbourg Unless you have a strong interest in this specific battle, and especially if you have limited time in Normandy, I would not make a visit to Cherbourg a high priority.  

On our first visit (1999) to Normandy, we had only six days.  Unsure whether or when we might return, we undertook very cursory explorations of all the landing beaches, the area around Sainte-Mère-Église, Pegasus Bridge and Merville Battery, and the battlefields between Caen and Falaise.  Our experience was little more than a “windshield tour” but was nonetheless a great introduction to Normandy.  On our last touring day, we took advantage of the N13 highway to race up to Cherbourg to visit Fort Fort du Roule, the massive fortification overlooking the port and city and the site of fierce fighting in 1944.  The views from here are worth a stop, but we were unimpressed by the museum.  That was all we saw of Cherbourg and we passed the Landront without seeing anything there.  

As we left the city headed east to Barfleur on the northeast corner of the Cotentin Peninsula, we passed the airport at Maupertus-sur-Mer and saw some of the extensive German defenses there.  At Barfleur we turned south on the D902, made a brief stop in scenic Saint-Vaast-la Houge, continued along the German beach defenses, then continued south to the Pérriers – Saint-Lô road which marked the bombing limit of Operation Cobra, and passed through Saint-Lô deep in the Bocage before returning to our B&B just north of Villers-Bocage.  All this in just one very long day! The experience was not as indepth as our other battlefield tours on this trip, but it provided a good sense of the lay of the land and the distances between places of interest.

We had much more time during our subsequent visits to Normandy, which included the exploration of the battlefields from Utah Beach north toward, but short of, Cherbourg.  We did not return to Cherbourg until our eighth and most recent trip in 2019.  By that time,  we had extensively explored all of the Normandy battlefields — except for the northernmost section of the Cotentin including Cherbourg.  Aided by two battlefield guide books (see below) and much reading and map study, I planned a detailed visit to the Landfront, the port itself, and the major coast batteries and sites of battles east and south of the city.  I did not anticipate having enough time to visit the German fortifications and coast batteries between the port and Cap de la Hague in the northwest corner of the peninsula — and that indeed was the case.  In fact, we did not have enough time to see anywhere close to what I had anticipated.

Below — Cherbourg looking northeast from Fort du Roule. Notice another fort on the breakwater. 

Our first stop was at Fort de Roule.  During my research I read that the French had opened some of galleries below the fort including coastal gun positions, as well as part of the land behind the fort (still the property of the French army) where much of the fighting had taken place.  That turned out to be incorrect — some galleries had been repaired, but no tours were being offered.   None of the land outside the fort was open.  But it was a beautiful clear day and, having done my homework, and with tour books in hand, we could identify the locations in the port and the city where heavy fighting took place.  The museum inside the fort had expanded in the two decades since our first visit, but in itself would not have been worth a return trip to Cherbourg.  In retrospect, the 90 minutes we were there would have been better spent exploring the Landfront and the coast.

Below — Looking north from Fort du Roule at the commercial port and two breakwater forts. 

We then traveled back down the N13 and turned left (northeast) at Délasse onto the small D56.  Along this road we traveled through the Landfront where the 313^th Infantry of the 79^th Infantry Division and the 8^th Infantry of the 4^th Infantry Division attacked.   

The road network in this hilly, dense hedgerow country had changed very little since 1944 and the intersections of the small rural roads provided a useful means of keeping track of where we were relative to the fighting.  However, it was slow going and it quickly became apparent that we would never complete the three tours with a total of 22 sites of interest that I had prepared.  

A great disappointment was to find that the casemates of Battery Hamburg had been overgrown by dense woods.  Another disappointment was missing several other coastal artillery positions between Battery Hamburg and Cherbourg — as well as some spectacular views of the sea coast.

Below — An Ammunition Bunker at a Flak Battery and Bunker on the D56 along the Landfront.

What to Expect and How to Plan However, there is much to see from WWII in the northern Cotentin.  The battle for Cherbourg was essential to the success of the Allied invasion, the breakout from Normandy, and the unexpectedly rapid advance across France and the Low Countries.  Given the opportunity, I could easlly spend two or three days on a return visit to Cherbourg to see all that we missed on our two short visits.  However, the battlefield lacks the information panels and memorials found almost everywhere else in Normandy.  You need to know what you want to see and how to find it, and even then it is easy to become lost among the hills and hedgerows.  In the summer, the lush vegetation conceals much of the remaining fortifications.

A car with GPS, good maps, and detailed tour route planned in advance are also essential.  The drive from Bayeux on the N13 takes about an hour and fifteen minutes.  Train service is available from Bayeux to Cherbourg, although the lack of car means missing much of the battlefield beyond the port.

Books and Self-Guided Battlefield Tours The following are excellent references for study of the battle of Cherbourg and planning a visit.

* Aubin, Nicolas; Liberty Roads — The American Logistics in France and in Germany, 1944-45.  Paris, France: Historie & Collections; 2014.  Without a doubt the most informative book I’ve read on how the US Army managed logistics in the ETO.  It includes extensive charts, photos, and maps — a must for any serious student of the 1944/45 campaign.

* Bradham, Randolph; To the Last Man: The Battle for Normandy’s Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany.  Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Books; 2008.  A well-written, concise overview of the US 12^th Army’s operations in the Cotentin and Brittany.

* Harrison, Gordon; Cross-Channel Attack from the official history of The US Army in World War II, The European Theater series.  Washington, D.C.: US Army Center for Military History; 1951.  This is the “Green Book” covering the cutting of the Cotentin and the advance to and taking of Cherbourg.  It provides detailed information and very helpful maps.

* Havers, R.P.W.; The Battle for Cherbourg from the Battle Zone Normandy series.  Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing Limited; 2004.  Within its 188 pages is an overview of the Cotentin campaign with black and white as well as color maps and photos.  A very useful guide book a bit more comprehensive than Rawson’s guidebook as it includes the clearing of Cap de la Hague as one of its four tours.

* Morison, Samuel Eliot; The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944-1945 from the History of United States Naval Opeations in World War II series.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company; 1957.  Chapter XII covers the naval gunfire support provided to the VII Corps at Cherbourg.

* Pallud, Jean Paul; “The Battle for Cherbourg” in After the Battle Number 1947.  Published in 2010, this magazine article provides an excellent summary of the assault on the fortified port and includes many “Then and Now” comparisons. 

* Rawson, Andrew; Cherbourg – The 4^th, 9^th, and 79^th US Infantry Divisions from the Battleground Europe: Normandy series.  Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Books; 2004.  In addition to providing a good overview, this 192-page guidebook provides self-guided tours following the operations of these three divisions inside Cherbourg and to its south and east, but not the Cap de la Hague area west of the port.  Black and white maps and photos.  Similar to Havers’ guidebook, but the two books together complement each other.

* Zaloga, Steven J.  Cherbourg 1944 — The First Allied Victory in Normandy.  Oxford, UK: Osprey Books; 2015.  Short and well-illiustrated, it covers the advance across the Cotentin to isolate Cherbourg, the battles between Utah Beach and the Landfront, and the final attack.  The color maps are quite good.

Maps Two 1:25,000 scale maps of the northernmost Cotentin Peninsula cover the port and the surrounding battlefield: Institut national de l’information (IGN) 1310 OT Cherbourg-en-Cotentin Pointe de Barfleur (eastern part) and IGN 1210 OT Cap de la Hague (western part).  These maps and GPS are essential for finding one’s way across the hills and through the dense hedgerows around Cherbourg. 

Closing Remarks Later blogs will provide background information for planning visits to the Breton ports of Saint-Malo, Brest, Lorient, and Saint-Nazaire; the Channel ports of Dieppe, Calais, and Dunkirk; and Antwerp and the Scheldt Estuary.

Below — The main entrance to Fort du Roule just beyond where Corporal John Kelly of Company G, the 314^th Infantry of the 79^th Infantry Division performed the heroic deed for which he received the Medal of Honor.  Corporal Kelly was killed in action on 23 November 1944 at the age of 21 and is buried in the American Épinal Cemetery and Memorial. 

Citation to Accompany the Medal of Honor: “For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty.  On 25 June 1944, in the vicinity of Fort du Roule, Cherbourg, France, when Cpl. Kelly’s unit was pinned down by heavy enemy machinegun fire emanating from a deeply entrenched strongpoint on the slope leading up to the fort, Cpl. Kelly volunteered to attempt to neutralize the strongpoint.  Arming himself with a pole charge about 10 feet long and with 15 pounds of explosive affixed, he climbed the slope under a withering blast of machinegun fire and placed the charge at the strongpoint’s base.  The subsequent blast was ineffective, and again, alone and unhesitatingly, he braved the slope to repeat the operation.  This second blast blew off the ends of the enemy guns.  Cpl. Kelly then climbed the slope a third time to place a pole charge at the strongpoint’s rear entrance.  When this had been blown open he hurled hand grenades inside the position, forcing survivors of the enemy guncrews to come out and surrender.  The gallantry, tenacity of purpose, and utter disregard for personal safety displayed by Cpl. Kelly were an incentive to his comrades and worthy of emulation by all.”